Syria and The Fall of The Assad Regime

Timeline of military offensive

The HTS offensive began on the 27th of November with the shockingly swift capture of Aleppo. As HTS entered Aleppo, the Kurdish rebel group Rojava elected not to open hostilities with HTS as long as Kurdish populations in the city were left alone. Minimising civilian casualties and pushing hard and fast against the Syrian army, Aleppo fell to HTS. Proceeding this, the rebels began heading southward down one of Syria’s main highways towards the strategically important city of Hama. Battles for Hama took place largely in the surrounding countryside. HTS’ use of drones as well as the practice of day and night capture put unprecedented stress on Assad’s forces. Eventually withdrawing, the Syrian army left behind military equipment, which was then seized by HTS, adding to their military arsenal.

The next city to be captured by HTS, arguably cementing their chance of victory, was Homs. Editor of the Syria Report newsletter, Jihad Yazigi highlighted its strategic importance, "Assad now cannot afford to lose anything else. The big battle is the one coming against Homs. If Homs falls, we are talking of a potential change of regime,".  With one shocking success after another, it became abundantly clear that this was a critical moment for the opposition forces. Instead of turning against one another, the different opposition factions of Syria including Rojava and the Syrian Democratic Forces, joined HTS to form a rebel coalition on the road to Homs and Damascus. As rebel groups continued to seize vital territory, weaknesses in the Syrian army became more glaringly obvious. Homs was expected to be a more tightly contested battle, as the Syrian Army sought to regroup for urban warfare operations. However, the attack on Homs was rapid and the army couldn’t put up the strong fight that was expected of them. By the next morning, the rebels had fully taken over Homs and the Army was in full retreat to Damascus.

As HTS approached Damascus from the North, Druze rebel groups from Daraa and Suwayda mounted their attack from the South and US backed Syrian Commandos from the East. As its allies failed to intervene in its greatest time of need, the regime fell in a dramatic turn of events in Syrian history. By December 7th, a week after Aleppo had first been captured in this shocking rebel offensive, HTS had Damascus firmly within reach. As Assad fled to Moscow, HTS declared it had fully dismantled the regime. With some of Syria’s most infamous prisons such as Sednaya liberated, the scale of the horrors of the Assad regime would become more apparent.  By the 8th December, the Syrian people were liberated from the Assad regime which had held an iron grip over the country for over 50 years.

How did the Regime crumble so quickly?

The question remains: how did a regime that appeared to be one of the strongest autocracies on the planet crumble in a matter of weeks at the hands of HTS and other rebel groups? The answer lies in the many failings of the Assad regime, both structurally and strategically.

The Syrian army, for one, was primarily composed of young, conscripted soldiers who lacked both the proper training and the ideological commitment to fight to the death for Assad. This was evident in their sluggish response to the HTS offensive and their rapid, often disorganized, withdrawals from key strategic cities such as Hama and Homs. Many of these soldiers, rather than engaging in prolonged resistance, simply deserted or surrendered, further accelerating the regime’s collapse in contested areas. The absence of a highly motivated and professionalized force proved to be one of Assad’s greatest weaknesses, as the rebels—though smaller in number—operated with a sense of purpose and adaptability that the regime’s forces lacked.

Compounding this issue was the regime’s increasing isolation from its traditional allies. Hezbollah, once a critical pillar of Assad’s war effort, redeployed many of its fighters back to Lebanon in response to Israel’s ground invasion. This sudden withdrawal left the regime vulnerable, particularly in regions where Hezbollah had previously played a crucial role in reinforcing Syrian government positions. Additionally, Iran, a long-time backer of Assad, appeared hesitant to fully commit at this stage of the conflict. With mounting economic troubles at home and escalating regional tensions, Tehran seemed unwilling to invest further resources into what was increasingly looking like a losing battle. This shift in geopolitical calculations left Assad without the direct military backing he had relied on for years.

Even Iraq, which had previously indicated a willingness to intervene, ultimately adopted a wait-and-see approach. As late as December 3rd, Iraqi officials contemplated sending forces into Syria, but their rhetoric quickly shifted to a more cautious stance, stating that intervention would only occur if ethnic minorities in Syria came under direct threat. This reflects a broader regional recalibration, as Assad’s neighbours appear more interested in securing their own national interests rather than expending resources to prop up a regime in freefall.

Ultimately, the rapid unravelling of Assad’s grip on power was not just a result of rebel offensives, but of a perfect storm of internal military weakness, a lack of committed external support, and shifting regional dynamics that left his regime increasingly isolated. Within days of the HTS offensive, the lack of strategic ability and backing from allies made Assad’s regime fatally weaker than was previously perceived.

Can we trust Ahmed al-Sharaa?

The new leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa has promised a bright new future for the embattled nation, entailing free and fair elections and ethnic tolerance. However, with previous ties to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can the international community begin to trust the new rebel President?

 Al-Sharaa has so far explicitly promised Syria’s ethnic minorities protection from violence and oppression. He has made it clear to Western media that HTS has undergone a radical transformation and has campaigned against its terrorist classification. Joshua Landis, head of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma highlighted the approach Al-Sharaa has taken to win over the Western media, “He’s retooled, he’s refashioned, made new allies and come out with his charm offensive.”

Since December, the new Syrian government has worked to undertake reconstruction of institutions. HTS along with its allies in the civil sector have undergone processes of removing unexploded weapons in major cities where fighting took place, and dealing with shortages of fuel and food. Interviewed recently for top UK podcast, ‘The Rest is Politics’, hosted by Alistair Campbell and Rory Stewart, Al-Sharaa appeared collected, put together and above all, Western. He even referred to ‘The state of Israel’, perhaps displaying HTS’ departure from Islamic State ideology that adamantly rejects Israel’s existence as a legitimate state.

Whether Al-Sharaa’s attempts at reassurance are purely just a PR strategy to convince the West to lift sanctions, his outreach to Western media represents a diplomatic engagement which marks a notable departure from its Al-Qaeda-linked past.

 What’s next for Syria?

Firstly, the fall of the Assad regime prompts the question of what will happen to the millions of Syrian refugees across the globe who are desperate to return to their homeland? At what point is the threat to human rights at a low enough level to allow these vulnerable communities to return?

The UK government has already paused the processing of Syrian asylum claims, leading to many fearful as to what their future will look like. President Erdogan of Türkiye (the country accommodating the largest number of Syrian refugees) has also opened the border gate between Türkiye and Syria as thousands flock to the border with the hopes of returning home. The people of Syria, domestic and displaced, will face huge decisions, which may not even be in their control, over their futures and livelihoods upon the change of regime.

 Secondly, it would be stating the obvious to say that Syria is facing a largely unpredictable political future. Should Al-Sharaa live up to the promises he has already made to rebuild Syria, restore stable governance and eventually democracy, as well as promising the protection of ethnic minorities, Syria

may have turned a bright new corner, away from decades of autocracy and oppression. On the other hand, HTS is still an internationally classified terrorist group. Could the promises made purely be a manipulation tactic with the aim of getting sanctions lifted? Could HTS impose a Jihadist state and become hostile to the West? Could the development of a new state cause irreversible damage to any remaining scraps of stability in the Middle East, and contribute to an all-out war?

How HTS will govern the whole of Syria can be informed by its governance of the Idlib province which has been under its control since 2017. In 2020, after a temporary ceasefire in fighting was reached, HTS was able to ‘establish its organizational structures, build bureaucratic institutions, and expand its governance efforts.’ Since 2017 and it’s move away from Islamic extremism, HTS has welcomed various religious and political individuals into its governmental organisations. Whilst having used brutal measures to keep control of Idlib, an ‘institutionalised security force’ meets a ‘semi-autonomous civilian government’ that manages the bureaucracy and day-to-day running of the province.

With HTS in power, Syria faces a future of many possibilities- potentially freer than under Assad, but also fraught with uncertainty given the complexities of HTS’ ideological history. Whilst Sharaa has his work cut out for him to gain the trust of the international community by showing HTS’ willingness to serve the Syrian people, the change in regime can be met largely with a cautious optimism. A country that has been torn apart by pain and conflict for over 50 years may be looking at the chance of at least partial hope of a better future.